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### OSD PRODUCT EVALUATION REPORT

## NIAM 35/36-2-75

# ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES, 13 JUNE 1975

#### OSD Declassification/Release Instructions on File

### Summary

The current draft of NIAM 35/36 is a substantial improvement over the previous draft, and is an important experiment in intelligence analysis. It represents a significant step forward by the Intelligence Community by directly comparing the capability of opposing foreign military forces, and by providing contingency analysis of the probable outcomes of conflicts between these forces. Such analysis is a useful expansion of the NIAM concept, and provides a basis through which the Community can make use of the advanced static and dynamic analysis techniques which have been developed for comparing U.S. and threat forces.

At the same time, the NIAM is experimental in approach, and deals with approaches to analysis that the Community has not used extensively in the past. There are also major uncertainties and gaps in the intelligence data available. Accordingly, while the overall assessment reached by the NIAM seems well supported, there are improvements from the user's perspective which should be considered in further drafts.

- -- The NIAM relies on a subjective and judgemental method of analysis to estimate the outcome of possible Arab-Israeli wars. This methodology is not explicitly described, and inevitably limits the confidence that can be placed in its results. The nature and limitations of this methodology need to be explicitly stated, and more advanced methodology may need to be utilized.
- -- Many of the major limitations and uncertainties in the intelligence data on the Arab-Israeli balance are summarized and some attempt is made to qualify the confidence in the assessments due to the limitations in data and methodology. Nonetheless, the documents do not adequately describe the major limitations in the data and uncertainties in the methods of analysis used in making the evaluations, such as the ability to appraise the impact of changes on the balance of tactical technology on each side.

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